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VAWA @ 20: ART, VIOLENCE, AND WOMEN 
 
Yxta Maya Murray* 
 
Morrison v. United States threatens to shrink our understandings of the 
violence women suffer and the varieties of harmony they deserve. In that 
way this Supreme Court decision that struck down the Violence Against 
Women Act’s civil provision proved a disaster in far more ways than one. 
Women often experience brutality, and seek—what, precisely? Ah, the 
old woman question. To understand these endurances and quests, we must 
fathom with far more precision what “violence” means to women, and what 
its opposite looks like to them. Until quite recently, such grand definitional 
projects seemed beyond the human ken. At the inception of second wave 
feminism, poet Muriel Rukeyser wrote: “What would happen if one woman 
told the truth about her life? The world would split open.”1 
More than twenty years later Catharine MacKinnon clamored that we 
barely know what a woman is, let alone all the sensations that she 
experiences.2 Robin West, too, lamented that patriarchy had strangled 
women’s abilities to speak about their pain and pleasure.3 Yet some 
progress prevailed: From feminist and womanist artists and critics came 
stories and even entirely new vocabularies defining women’s mingled 
experiences with violence, happiness, suffering, bliss, rape, abortion, work, 
and sex. Louise Erdrich wrote novels about women’s struggles to gain 
family, stay safe, and nourish even the tiniest seeds of happiness in the face 
                                                
* Professor, Loyola Law School. With thanks to Wangechi Mutu. 
1 Kathe Kollwitz, in MURIEL RUKEYSER, OUT OF SILENCE: SELECTED POEMS 132 (Kate 
Daniels ed., 1994). 
2 See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 117 
(1989) (“Women’s situation offers no outside to stand on or gaze at, no inside to escape to, 
too much urgency to wait, no place else to go, and nothing to use but the twisted tools that 
have been shoved down our throats.”). 
3 Robin West, The Difference in Women’s Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological 
Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 15 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 150, 153 (2000). 
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of violent poverty and white supremacy.4 In Austria, novelist Elfriede 
Jelinek described the myriad ways capitalism and male dominance trash and 
kill women.5 Irish installation artist Cathy Wilkes voiced the rigors and 
despairs that come with living within this beleaguered thing, the female 
body.6 Angela Harris and Kimberlé Crenshaw studied how race and gender 
interacted in women’s experiences of violence as well as in their own 
practices of world- and self-building.7 Carrie Mae Weems argued that 
history’s violence creates the present moment and also engaged in 
peacemaking in her own efforts to reclaim that past in her art.8 
Two thousand’s Morrison laid waste to these truths due to the 
majority’s etiolated imaginings of woman violence’s marauding effects. 
Yet, feminist lawyers striving to write a constitutionally secure anti-
violence law learned early in the legislative process that any ambitious 
definitions of violence would be hammered down by Congressional politics. 
What was the violence that VAWA would go after in its civil remedy, 
which was powered in part by the Commerce Clause?9 Though VAWA 
begins promisingly enough, announcing that it protects women’s rights to 
be “free from crimes of violence motivated by gender,”10 this potentially 
galactic compact was later limited by then-Senator Joseph Biden11 to those 
offenses that constituted “a felony against the person or property where the 
conduct presented a serious risk of physical injury to another.”12 VAWA 
also specified that it did not protect against “random” acts of violence that 
                                                
4 One of my favorites of Erdrich’s remains LOUISE ERDRICH, THE BEET QUEEN (1986). 
5 ELFRIEDE JELINEK, THE PIANO TEACHER (Joachim Neugroschel trans., Grove Press 
2009) (1983); ELFRIEDE JELINEK, LUST (Michael Hulse trans., Serpent’s Tail 1993) (1989). 
6 See Yxta Maya Murray, Feminist Engagement and the Museum, 1 BR. J. AM. LEG. 
STUDIES 31, 52-54 (2012). 
7 See Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black 
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 
189 U. OF CHI. LEGAL FORUM 139 (1989); Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: 
Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. 
REV. 1241 (1993); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 
STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990). 
8 See Yxta Maya Murray, From Here I Saw What Happened and I Cried: Carrie Mae 
Weems’ Challenge to the Harvard Archive, 8 UNBOUND: HARV. J. LEGAL LEFT 1 (2012). 
9 Congress also invoked section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which the Court 
declared constitutionally unsound on the unspeakable grounds of the Civil Rights Cases. 
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 621. 
10 Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 13981(d)(1) (2014). 
11 Biden was VAWA’s backer, and he limited the definition of crimes of violence in 
response to questions raised by Senators of the Judiciary Committee and the Justice 
Department. Victoria F. Noursea, Where Violence, Relationship, and Equality Meet: The 
Violence Against Women’s Act’s Civil Rights Remedy, 11 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 13-15 
(1996). 
12 VAWA, supra note 11 at § 13981(d)(2). 
2014] VAWA @ 20: ART, VIOLENCE, AND WOMEN  
 
29
could not be proved motivated by gender under a preponderance of the 
evidence.13 Not under VAWA, then, would women be free of the violences 
that Erdrich, Harris, Weems, and others described. That is, VAWA would 
not protect them from gendered white supremacy,14 of being cast aside by 
capitalist culture when they no longer proved attractive to the male gaze,15 
or of the pains of raising children without support.16 But, perhaps, they 
might at least be liberated of felonious abuses that bruised them so into 
submission, terror, and silence that even Congress agreed these crimes 
rippled into the broader worlds of U.S. markets.17 
Morrison then amputated this modest definition of violence at its root. 
Even the most recognizable and agreed-upon forms of violence against 
women (rape, battery) did not affect commerce, we learned from the 
Supreme Court: “Aggregate” impacts would not trigger the Commerce 
Clause since such a calculus would threaten federalism.18 As MacKinnon 
wrote dryly: “How rape became ‘purely interstate’ challenges the 
imagination.”19 
What then of the feminist experiment of defining women’s experiences 
of violence and limning their desires for a better life? Upon reading 
Morrison, one feared that the world would never be split open. Yet if the 
decision seemed to solder the universe shut, the project begun by Rukeyser, 
Erdrich, Jelinek, MacKinnon, West, Harris, Wilkes, Weems, and so many 
others deserves continued study by woman-identified lawyers. Feminist 
legal scholars and activists laboring to staunch violence against women, and 
to build its happier antagonist, which I would label as “peace”—whatever 
that refractory word might mean—need to continue unearthing the 
significances of these conditions despite Morrison’s failures. 
Art provides a resource for such seekers. I have written in other venues 
                                                
13 VAWA, supra note 11 at § 13981(e)(1). 
14 Which is the violence described by the likes of Louise Erdrich, supra note 5; as well 
as Crenshaw and Harris, supra note 8; and Weems, supra note 9. 
15 This is Jelinek’s complaint, supra note 6. 
16 Wilkes’ work can be seen as an indictment of our society’s treatment of mothers. 
Murray, supra note 7. 
17 Morrison, 529 at 615 (“Congress found that gender-motivated violence affects 
interstate commerce ‘by deterring potential victims from traveling interstate, from 
engaging in employment in interstate business, and from transacting with business, and in 
places involved in interstate commerce; . . . by diminishing national productivity, 
increasing medical and other costs, and decreasing the supply of and the demand for 
interstate products.’” (quoting S. REP. NO. 103–138, at 29 (1993)). 
18 Id. at 615: “If accepted, petitioners’ reasoning would allow Congress to regulate any 
crime as long as the nationwide, aggregated impact of that crime has substantial effects on 
employment, production, transit, or consumption.” 
19 Catherine A. MacKinnon, Disputing Male Sovereignty: On United States v. 
Morrison, 114 HARV. L. REV. 135, 150 (2000) (quoting Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1752). 
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how visual art might inform legal processes,20 and also how lawyers and 
peacemakers need to build a more complete vocabulary of violence and 
peace.21 Here, I bring these ideas together, and insist that art made by 
women should also constitute what I have called artifacts in the feminist 
anti-violence, and perhaps pro-peace project.22 The term “artifacts” 
designates art made by people traditionally turned into mute legal subjects, 
and whose works communicate untold truths about women’s experiences of 
violence and their interpretations of peace.23 These art products are both art 
objects—the art—as well as evidence that legal actors may study—the 
facts. Women’s artifacts help us define troublesomely inchoate concepts of 
brutality and concord so that we may bring such revelations into legal 
thought. 
In the remainder of this essay I contribute to this undertaking, and study 
the difficult oeuvre of collagist Wangechi Mutu. Mutu was born in Kenya 
and lives today in Brooklyn,24 and her astonishing, often ungentle coalition 
of magazine clippings earned her a retrospective at the Brooklyn Museum 
and representation by the Saatchi Gallery.25 In interviews, Mutu has 
specified that her art articulates the world of “chimeras, these creatures, 
these woman warriors . . . . they’re not me, per se, they’re human 
conditions.”26 Many of Mutu’s clippings are taken from pornography and 
fashion magazines that feature African-American models, and she often 
combines features of Black and White women.27 She takes as her missions 
the study of how Black male and female bodies have been dragooned by 
White supremacy, and also finds inspiration in how Black women can still 
                                                
20 See, e.g., Yxta Maya Murray, Rape Trauma, the State, and the Art of Tracey Emin, 
100 CAL. L. REV. 1631 (2012). 
21 See Yxta Maya Murray, Law and the Possibilities of Peace, SEATTLE J. FOR SOCIAL 
JUSTICE (forthcoming July 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2461525. 
22 See Murray, supra note 21, at 1663. 
23 Id. 
24 These details can be found in Rachel Wolff, She’ll Probably Cut Up This Magazine 
Too, NEW YORK MAGAZINE, Aug. 25, 2013, http://nymag.com/guides/fallpreview/2013/ 
wangechi-mutu-2013-9/. 
25 Id.; see also Wangechi Mutu, SAATCHI GALLERY (Oct. 28, 2014, 7:56 PM), 
http://www.saatchigallery.com/artists/wangechi_mutu.htm. 
26 Interview with Barbara Kruger, quoted in Klaus Ottmann, The Human Form Divine: 
Wangechi Mutu’s “Enceptual” Art, in MUTU, GUGGENHEIM BERLIN, & DEUTSCHE BANK, 
WANGECHI MUTU: ARTIST OF THE YEAR 2010 64 (2010). 
27 See Deborah Willis, Wangechi Mutu, BOMB MAGAZINE, Feb. 28, 2014, 
http://bombmagazine.org/article/1000052/Wangechi Mutu (“Black models and figures are 
almost absent in contemporary art and even in popular fashion magazines. I’d like to hear 
your thoughts about this and how you are re-inserting these images from pin-up girls to 
imaginary figures. You also insert white skin, blond hair, and red lips, and place these cut-
out body parts and merge with black skin.”). 
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be “inappropriate” and transcend.28 Here are but two of Mutu’s portraits of 





                                                
28 Id. (“The black female body has been violated and revered in very specific ways by 
the outsider—Europeans, especially. The issues that pertain to race: pathologizing the 
black mind, exoticizing and fearing of the black body, objectifying the body as a specimen, 
or a sexual machine, or a work animal, or relating the black body to non-human species as 
a way to justify cruelty . . . All these are practices that are placed excessively upon the 
black female body.”); see also description of the performer Grace Jones, and how she is 
inappropriate and transcendent. Id. 
29 WANGECHI MUTU, UNTITLED (2004), available at 
http://www.saatchigallery.com/imgs/artists/mutu_wangechi/20091124042145_wangechi_
mutu_untitledne.jpg. 





In the first image, we find a complex study of atrocity. Here, Mutu 
composes a woman out of a broken body parts and squashed motorcycle 
bits. She is bleeding. She is also in free fall, like Lucifer tumbling to earth.31 
Either a pink plant is blooming from her skull or we are observing the 
sanguinary evidence of an exit wound. But even in the midst of this danger, 
the woman looks at her observer with a smile on her face, and poses her 
body like a coquette’s. From the burst of abdominal blood flies out what 
appears to be some sort of cyborg butterfly, which is perhaps a distressing 
or sublime version of the fetus. 
Mutu’s work nestles self-respect within a larger map of abuse. This 
subject behaves like a good girl even as she disintegrates and plummets to 
her death. Beauty is mapped onto her wounds—the head flower made of 
                                                
30 WANGECHI MUTU, UNTITLED (2004), available at 
http://www.escapeintolife.com/artist-watch/wangechi-mutu/. 
31 “How art thou fallen from heaven, O Lucifer, son of the morning! how art thou cut 
down to the ground, which didst weaken the nations!” Isaiah 14:12 (King James). 
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blood, the spectral butterfly swooping out from her exploded womb. The 
subject’s recalcitrant dignity doesn’t come from her good girl behavior or 
her sublime accessories, though: It comes from her sad, calm eyes, which 
do not shirk from looking straight back at you. 
We learn about violence from this piece of Mutu’s. Violence here does 
not only encompass federally and state-recognized felonies. Rather, the 
Mutu’s chimera’s injuries most probably stem also from “random” violence 
that issues from history, that hails from racism and consumer culture, and 
that emerges from the ether of the legal world mapped and locked by 
Morrison. It is found equally in the gushers of blood as it is in the high heels 
that trap the chimera’s feet, which are so pertly posed like a movie star’s. 
And this violence is not just local—it spans high and wide enough to be 
universal, even aerial. This violence comes from all directions. Yet it does 
not foreclose the agency and self-possession that the woman warrior 
expresses through her eyes. 
We cannot see the force that bludgeoned the chimera. She is out of 
context. By so placing her in mapless space, Mutu pushes back against the 
limiting vision of Morrison to show that the powers of history and greed 
combine to create a violence that is so large that it proves handless and 
eyeless. It flows from more than one trigger. And its effects can be felt not 
only within the borders of a state but also in the sky, by human angels. This 
manifesto on violence obviously creates a conundrum for lawyers, who 
need labels and discrete causes and effects. But Mutu’s puzzle also offers an 
opportunity for feminist legal agitators, who may be encouraged by her 
work to explore legal or perhaps post-legal32 redresses that grapple with the 
legacies of slavery and colonialism, of rape and reproductive control, 
without ever collapsing into the superstition that women’s self-possession 
has been destroyed by subordination. Mutu’s art certainly goads us to work 
to name violences that extend far beyond extant legal imaginings, arguing 
that these as-yet unnamed origins of harm are killers as deadly as the 
felonies described by the vanquished VAWA. 
Does the second work teach us about a feminist fathoming of “peace?” 
It comes closer to that condition than the first, certainly. In this image we 
discover a woman wearing skins made of stars or animal pelts, or maybe 
she has self-defensively taken on the colors of her environment like a 
chameleon. Either her face, or a mask, is made of mountains and moons. 
Her expression, again, conveys an extraordinary message. In Mutu’s words, 
she transcends and is inappropriate. To me, also, she is remarkable because 
she looks satisfied. 
Is satisfaction a definition of peace? And why should this concept of 
                                                
32 See Murray, supra note 22, at 27-28. 
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peace matter to women? I have argued in other work that peace should form 
a specific goal towards which we should strive in law and through other 
technologies33—but before we try to create a peaceful world, we have to 
find out what that signifies. I have defined peace before in terms of love, 
connection, and nourishing relationships (what some have called, also, 
“positive peace”), as well as an absence of violence (also known as 
“negative peace”).34 I have additionally attempted to avoid a stereotypical 
and all-encompassing interpretation of the term “peace,” particularly as I 
have concluded that peace will always exist on a continuum (as does 
violence) and probably in an incomplete state.35 
But despite these intricacies, peace’s creation remains a worthy 
ambition. A woman’s peace is a wary, difficult, striding thing—not passive 
or nerveless in the least. Women’s demands for peace will certainly be 
arduous and sometimes clashing, but they will hustle for rights greater than 
the crumbs that Congress and the high Court would not even give us. For 
one thing, women’s peace should mean more than the absence of violence.36 
What else does it require? To circle back to Mutu: It may encompass 
satisfaction—but how do you get that for women? Well, feminists have 
already started to come up with a list: 
Peace probably means that we could be ourselves.37 It would mean that 
we could have kindred, family, and comrades.38 We could have work.39 We 
would have dignity.40 We could get pleasure.41 We would have housing.42 
                                                
33 See, e.g., Law and the Possibilities of Peace, supra note 22; Yxta Maya Murray, A 
Jurisprudence of Nonviolence, 9 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 65, 122-23 (2009). 
34 See Law and the Possibilities of Peace, supra note 22, at 20. 
35 Id. at 18-21. 
36 This is the negative definition of peace, according to peace theorist Johan Galtung. 
Id. at 20. 
37 See, e.g., Dylan Vade, Expanding Gender and Expanding the Law: Toward a Social 
and legal Conceptualization of Gender that is More Inclusive of Transgender People, 11 
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 253, 273 (2005) (“I would like to let go of the need to have a 
cohesive linear narrative, and the need to have just one narrative. My life is complex. All 
our lives are complex. I would like to see us use our narratives in ways that empower us 
and that allow us to freely explore, and become, ourselves. For this to become a possibility, 
we have to tell and share many more narratives, the complicated and the simple, and to be 
very careful not to reify or institutionalize any particular one.”). 
38 See, e.g., Pedro A. Malavet, Outsider Citizenship and Multidimensional Borders: 
The Power and Danger of Not Belonging, 52 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 321, 324 (2005) 
(describing the communitarian values of LatCrit, a Latina/o-centered brand of legal 
theory). 
39 See, e.g., Jill Maxwell, Leveraging the Courts to Protect Women’s Fundamental 
Rights at the Intersection of Family Wage Work Structures and Women’s Role as Wage 
Earner and Primary Caregiver, 20 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 127, 128 (2012) (“most 
women, including married women, need to work to support their families”). 
40 See, e.g., Julie Shapiro, Reflections on Complicity, 8 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 657, 677 
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We would even have a shot at the pursuit of happiness.43 Mutu’s woman 
made of the earth and sky gives us yet another part of peace to strive for, 
which is her cheerful, prideful ease. Women and men deserve a world 
where such an attainment is possible. The law should help us create such a 
world. 
Is it too zany to hope for such a beautiful future? Is it too dangerous? 
Right now, it’s certainly legally inconceivable. 
But that’s why we should look to art, to help pave a road and a language 
that works for this implausible, precarious good.   Artifacts not only give 
birth to new knowledge about that which is brutal and that which is pacific, 
but also to new aspirations, and new ways of being. Art helps make that 
which is unspoken and chanceless into a coherent question—such as:  
What would happen if we tried to enact a Peace for Women Act? 
The realist replies: Probably a whole bunch of meetings and then 
nothing. First, women couldn’t agree on what peace mean in the first place. 
And even if they did, it wouldn’t get past the legislature. And even if it did, 
then it would get struck down by the courts. We’d be looking at a probably 
99.9 percent chance that the PfWA would be yet another failure. 
But there’s always the possibility that something great could come of it. 
Maybe we would have a conversation about not only what kind of world we 
didn’t want, but what kind of tradition we wanted to create. Maybe within 
all the loss there could be at least one success—some small legislative or 
judicial victory that could push women’s welfares forward. Maybe we could 
develop non-legal institutions or structures or relationships that would foster 
the conditions that we seek to make. And then maybe, just maybe, the world 
would split open a little wider. And within the space that we built, we could 
lay a table for Mutu’s smiling, superheroically masked chimera. We could 
sit next to her for a while and feel something like satisfaction. For in doing 
this worthy work, we wouldn’t have just softened women’s free fall. We 
wouldn’t have labored only for a right to damages for the damage done to 
us. Rather, we could imagine all it would take to be what we wanted to be. 
We could set a course for a world where we might sometimes feel as if we 
were made of all the bounties of the earth and the heavens, and were at one 
with mountains, stars, wildebeests, and luminous moons. 
 
                                                                                                                       
(2005) (noting that as a feminist anti-essentialist and advocate of LGBT rights the author 
encourages a “broader struggle seeking liberty and dignity, not only for lesbians and gay 
men but also for other marginalized communities”). 
41 See, e.g,. Katherine Franke, Theorizing Yes, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 181 (2001). 
42 See, e.g., Lenora M. Lapidus, Doubly Victimized: Housing Discrimination Against 
Victims of Domestic Violence, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 377 (2003). 
43 See, e.g., West, supra note 4. 
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